The Federal Constitution is Not Violated by a State Law Compelling One Accused of  Crime to Testify Against Himself by Brewster, James H.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
1909
The Federal Constitution is Not Violated by a State
Law Compelling One Accused of Crime to Testify
Against Himself
James H. Brewster
University of Michigan Law School
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1304
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Courts Commons
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository.
For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brewster, James H. "The Federal Constitution is Not Violated by a State Law Compelling One Accused of Crime to Testify Against
Himself." Mich. L. Rev. 7 (1909): 242-4.
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION is NOT VIOLATED aY A STATE LAW COMPELLING
ONE ACCUSED OF CRIME To TESTIFY AGAINST HISELF.-At first sight this
proposition seems a little startling, but a careful consideration of the opinion
of Mr. Justice M11OODY in the recent case of Twining et aL v. The State of
New Jersey, 29 Sup. Ct. R. 14, probably will satisfy most readers that it is
sound.
The plaintiffs in error were convicted of a criminal offense in the trial
court, the judgment of conviction was affirmed in the court of errors and
appeals of New Jersey, and they assign for error that by the mode of pro-
ceedings adopted at the trial they were denied the right of an accused person
not to be compelled to testify against himself, which they maintain is a right
secured to them by the Constitution of the United States.
On the trial the accused called no witnesses, nor did they themselves tes-
tify, although the law of the state gave them the right to do so. The law
of New Jersey permitted an unfavorable inference against the accused to be
drawn by the jury from their failure to testify in denial of the evidence
which tended to incriminate them and the trial court in substance so
instructed the jury. Assuming that what was done at the trial was an
infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination-though not deciding
this point-the court proceeds to examine the question whether such a law
violates the i4th Amendment, either by abridging the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States or by depriving persons of their life,
liberty or property without due process of law.
Admitting that much might be said in favor of the view that the privilege
was guaranteed against state impairment as a privilege and immunity of
national citizenship, Mr. Justice MOODY shows that the decisions of the
-Supreme Court have foreclosed that view.
It was not argued by plaintiffs in error that they are protected by that
part of the 5th Amendment which provides that no "person * * * shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," for they
recognize that the first ten Amendments are not operative on the states, but
they do contend that this privilege is one of the fundamental rights of
national citizenship, placed under national protection by the I4th Amendment,
and that the "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States"
protected against state action by this Amendment include those fundamental
personal rights which were protected against national action by the first
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eight Amendments. These contentions, Mr. Justice Mtoouy holds, are
answered by the decisions of the Supreme Court: that the distinction between
national and state citikenship and their respective privileges drawn in the
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, has come to be firmly established: that
"if, then, it be assumed, without deciding the point, that an' exemption from
compulsory self-incrimination is what is described as a fundamental right
belonging to all who live under a free government, and incapable of impair-
ment by legislation or judicial decision, it is, so far as the states are con-
cerned, a fundamental right inherent in state citizenship, and is a privilege
or -immunity of that citizenship only": that the contention that the safeguards
of personal rights which are enumerated in the first eight articles of Amend-
ment, though they were by those Amendments originally secured only against
national action, are among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States and protected against state action by the i4th Amendment,
while supported by weighty arguments (see the opinions of Mr. Justice
FIrLD in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 361, and of Mr. Justice HARLAN in
Makwuell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 606) is no longer open; it having been
definitely settled that "the i4th Amendment did not forbid the states to
abridge the personal rights enumerated in the first eight Amendments,,
because those rights were not within the meaning of the clause 'privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States.'"
It is held further that this exemption from compulsory self-incrimination
is not required by due process of law. It is clear as matter of history that
the practice of compulsory self-incrimination existed for centuries after
Magna Charta (WIGMoRE, EvIDrNCP, § 2250), and by an historical survey the.
opinion in this case shows that during the time when the meaning of due
process was in a formative state the exemption from compulsory self-incrim-
ination was not considered to be inherent in due process of law, but, on the
other hand, a right independent and outside of due process. "Even if," the
opinion concludes, "the historical meaning of due process of law and the
decisions of this court did not exclude the privilege -from it, it would be
going far to rate it as an immutable principle of justice which is the inalien-
able possession of every citizen of a free government. Salutary as the prin-
ciple may seem to the great majority, it cannot be ranked with the right to
hearing before condemnation, the immunity from arbitrary power not acting
by general laws, and the inviolability of private property. The wisdom of
the exemption has never been universally assented to since the days of
Bentham, many doubt it today, and it is best defended not as an unchange-
able principle of universal justice, but as a law proved by experience to be
expedient. See WIGMORE, EVIDNC, § 2251. * * * The states had
guarded the privilege to the satisfaction of their own people up to the adop-
tion of the i4th Amendment. No reason is perceived why they cannot con-
tinue to do so."
In dissenting, Mr. Justice HARLAN affirms that no former decision of
the Supreme Court requires the present decision: a view somewhat incon-
sistent with his opinion in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S., at page 6r5. He
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quotes from Mr. Justice BRADLEY'S opinion in Boyd v. United States, ii6
U. S. 616, 631, 633, that "any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's
oath, or compelling the production of his private books and papers, to con-
vict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles of
a free government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is
abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit the purposes of
despotic power, but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty
and personal freedom."
Nevertheless, it may still be true that there are very important personal
rights, those named, for example, in the first eight Amendments, that are
not necessarily "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States"
within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581.
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